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This study is interested in cross-national differences in public preferences toward different forms of political steering.
Using data from the International Social Survey Programme it was found that there is quite substantial variation
between countries in policy preferences. It is suggested that this variation can be explained by the variation in the
quality of public institutions (i.e. Quality of Government, QoG). Low QoG is associated with a preference for
coercive regulatory instruments and an aversion toward reward-based instruments. The explanation provided is that
low QoG is correlated with low social trust, which produces suspicion of defection and an urge to punish free-riders
with strong or coercive instruments. Meanwhile, the aversion toward reward-based instruments decreases as the level
of QoG increases. The public administration then has the bureaucratic capacity to deal with policies that demand
bureaucratic discretion and actors are less likely to free-ride, generating a preference for reward-based incentives and
less need for regulation.
Keywords: collective dilemmas; quality of government; environmental policy; regulatory
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Several recent studies (Aghion et al., 2010; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2009;
Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., 2011; Pinotti, 2011) find that there is strong public demand for
government regulation in countries with corrupt and inefficient public institutions, which
the researchers find rather counter-intuitive. Aghion et al. (2010, p. 1018) ask, ‘why do
people in countries with bad governments want more government intervention?’ To
answer this question, they suggest the hypothesis that distrust in other actors generates a
demand for regulation. According to Aghion et al. (2010), the explanation is that govern-
ment failure and market failure correlate. In societies where governments are not able to
provide common or public goods, the market also fails to provide such goods, and the
levels of trust are generally low in such societies. People trust neither public institutions nor
others such as business actors and citizens in general. There is a common conception that
business actors cheat; as a result, there is a demand for more control. The urge to punish
free-riders with strong or coercive regulation outweighs concerns about corrupt and
inefficient political institutions. Consequently, the general public demands more regulation
of business, even though they have little trust in the institutions charged with enforcing
those regulations.
There are advanced theories to explain why this trade-off between government failure
and market failure generates a demand for regulation (e.g. Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000;
Aghion et al., 2010), and some studies have investigated whether the trade-off actually
affects citizens’ attitudes toward regulation. These studies also find that low trust in business
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2010; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2009; Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., 2011; Pinotti, 2011).
Building on these results, this article examines whether the quality of public institutions
and trust also influences the choice of policy instrument, such as the choice between
economic incentives and stricter regulation. For example, when faced with ecologically
unsustainable consumption patterns, the state can use different pro-environmental policy
instruments in an effort to change activities or behaviours that have negative environmental
consequences. It can use taxes or subsidies, for instance, so that externalities are reflected
in prices, or redistribute resources to those whose behaviour is environmentally friendly, or
it can impose regulations to limit or prohibit certain actions. It is plausible that people could
want both more taxation and more regulation in order to punish defection in areas such as
environmental pollution. However, previous research has shown substantial cross-country
variation in preferences for different pro-environmental policy instrument options, with
corrupt political institutions generating aversion toward economic incentives (Harring,
2014). Based on that result and the understanding that the maintenance of pro-
environmental policy instruments contains free-riding risks, this study tests whether the
level of Quality of Government (QoG) in a country affects policy preferences, and
whether economic incentives (such as taxes) are distinct from regulation (such as heavier
fines).
This inquiry is developed further in the next section, which considers the effects of
social and political trust on policy preferences and then derives testable hypotheses. This is
followed by a discussion of the data from the International Social Survey Programme
(2012) and the methodology – a multinomial hierarchical model. Subsequently, the
hypotheses are tested, and the results and concluding remarks are presented.
Understanding Preferences for Different Policy Instruments
A baseline assumption in this article is that the level of QoG affects people’s perceptions
about the potential of the state. Higher levels of QoG imply a greater potential to deliver
goods in terms of social welfare and environmental health. Yet, as Aghion et al. (2010), for
example, have shown, the demand for state intervention in terms of regulation is higher in
countries with low QoG than in countries with high QoG. In low QoG countries
free-riding risks are high, which generates a demand for regulation, while in high QoG
countries free-riding risks are low and hence there is less need for regulation. With
economic incentives, there are good reasons to believe that the level of QoG has another
effect on the demand for political steering. Taxes and subsidies imply money transfers with
a high risk of corrupt behaviour, and in countries with low QoG, the state has severe
difficulties in collecting taxes and actually delivering services. Hence, people are not likely
to demand more economic instruments, such as taxes or other economic incentives, in
countries with low levels of QoG. The literature on welfare policy, for instance, indicates
that countries with impartial, uncorrupted and effective public institutions have more
generous welfare programmes (Holmberg et al., 2009; Rothstein et al., 2012) and are more
likely to implement social policies that demand bureaucratic discretion (Dahlström et al.,
2013). People in such countries are also generally more in favour of generous subsidies
and higher taxation (Svallfors, 2013; see also Rothstein, 2009; Rothstein and Stolle,
2008; Svallfors, 1997; 2003). Moreover, a recent study finds that corruption, both as a
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cross-country variable and as an individual-level perception, is negatively correlated with
the perceived effectiveness of economic pro-environmental instruments compared to
other instruments. Based on the argument that low QoG generates an aversion to bigger
government in terms of money transfers, it is concluded that corruption affects people’s
preferences for pro-environmental policy instruments (Harring, 2014). Furthermore, a
number of studies show that political trust, as a perception of the quality of political
institutions, is important when explaining support for environmental taxes (Hammar and
Jagers, 2006; Harring and Jagers, 2013). Hence, the first hypothesis:
H1: When QoG is low, people have a preference for regulation and an aversion toward
taxation, and as the level of QoG increases, the aversion toward taxation decreases and the
preference for regulation decreases.
However, the previously suggested causal link between low QoG and demand for more
regulation is not through perceptions of the government or the public administration, but
rather through perceptions of other actors (Aghion et al., 2010; Di Tella and MacCulloch,
2009; Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., 2011; Pinotti, 2011). In countries with ineffective and
corrupt political institutions, trust in business actors and citizens in general is low. Con-
sequently, people want to punish polluters with more regulation, and by doing so also
prevent the entrance of even more polluters or free-riders. Perceptions of other actors are,
arguably, also important when explaining the choice between different kinds of policies
since some policies contain elements of free-riding risks. Hence, imposing pro-
environmental policy instruments implies moving from the collective action dilemma of
pro-environmental action to a new collective action dilemma. A similar argument is often
made in the literature on collective management of common pool resources, where studies
highlight these risks. When communities try to deal with problems of collective action,
they may end up in second-order collective action problems (Dietz et al., 2002; see also
Heckathorn, 1989; Olivier, 1980; Ostrom, 1998). Surveillance of the principles for
maintenance is costly so it is yet another collective action dilemma, where people have
incentives to free-ride and obtain the full benefits from the sanctioning scheme but not pay
the costs. We can also think of governmental instruments or institutions that involve such
characteristics. As John Scholz and Mark Lubell (1998) argue, a well-functioning tax system
is a collective action dilemma where the perceptions of government and trust in fellow
citizens both affect tax compliance:
Compliance involves a ... risky relationship; citizens undertake some immediate costly effort
like paying taxes, and face some risk that future collective benefits expected in return for
compliance ... may not materialize unless the government and other citizens maintain their
side of the bargain (Scholz and Lubell, 1998, p. 400).
Simply stated, for people to pay taxes willingly they have to trust that other people will also
pay taxes and that the government can provide public goods such as social welfare and
environmental protection.1 In order for environmental taxes or pro-environmental subsi-
dies to be efficient, people and companies have to actually pay their taxes and/or not claim
subsidies to which they are not entitled. Hence, for people to prefer such policies,
they have to trust their fellow citizens and politicians. Scholz and Lubell make another
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important point: if people do not pay their taxes, compliance must be achieved by stricter
enforcement mechanisms, such as stronger regulation.
Without trust, the potential benefits of collective action must depend either on altruism or on
enforcement mechanisms capable of ensuring that the benefits of free-riding are overshad-
owed by the expected punishments for not fulfilling obligations (Scholz and Lubell, 1998,
p. 400).
This argument is in line with that of Aghion et al. (2010) – namely, that people in low-trust
countries prefer or demand more government intervention. A regulation scheme can of
course also evolve into a collective action dilemma, where people enjoy the benefits of the
scheme but break the rules, for example, because of lax law enforcement. However, in
theory such situations generate a demand for even stricter regulations or at least stricter
enforcement of regulations – that is, more punishment. Nevertheless, violations of a
subsidy scheme or tax system will not generate a demand for more rewards such as subsidies
nor for higher taxes. This is important, since this study is not concerned with explaining
compliance as such, but rather preferences for different policies. Trust is thus a key
component in preference formation. People will not support a system that they fear will be
cheated and abused. Therefore, those who have little trust that their fellow citizens (or
other actors) are complying are not likely to prefer economic incentive rewards, but rather
to prefer regulatory punishments because people want to punish defectors (e.g. Fehr and
Gächter, 2002; Herrmann et al., 2008). If people trust others, because free-riding risks are
lower, there is less need for punishment and regulation.
H2: Low social trust generates a preference for regulation and an aversion toward taxation, and
as social trust increases, the aversion toward taxation decreases and the preference for
regulation decreases.
The effects of social trust on policy preference could be seen as an indirect effect of
QoG, as QoG is argued to generate social trust. Different causal paths have been sug-
gested. One suggestion is that defecting or non-cooperative behaviour becomes a costly
strategy for actors in countries with high QoG because effective institutions can find and
punish those who do not fulfill contracts or who cheat in other ways. Therefore, social
trust increases as the risk of being cheated is reduced. Another suggestion is that people
infer from the behaviour of public officials and draw conclusions regarding whether
their fellow citizens can be trusted or not. Hence, in high QoG countries people keep
their promises and social trust increases (e.g. Levi, 1998; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008).
There are those who challenge this claim, arguing that it is the other way around – that
social trust generates well-functioning democratic institutions (e.g. Knack, 2002;
Putnam, 1993). It is far beyond the scope of this article to determine the causal direction
between these entities. However, they are clearly correlated and are most likely to
reinforce each other. Yet, the assumption in this article is that QoG generates social trust
– an assumption for which there is plenty of empirical support (e.g. Delhey and
Newton, 2005; Dinesen, 2012; 2013; Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010; Herreros, 2009;
Nannestad et al., 2013; Newton, 1999; 2007; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008; compare
Bjørnskov, 2007; Robbins, 2012).
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So far in this article political steering has been discussed in terms of regulation versus
economic incentives. However, political steering of consumption or production patterns
is an act of power, which can take different forms and be categorised in several ways. One
distinction is between punishment, reward and persuasion (e.g. Vedung, 1998). Regulation
and economic incentives could be seen as various forms of punishment and reward,
respectively. The third category – persuasion – would then be a softer kind of public
steering, for example, in the form of information or communication. Low levels of social
trust and QoG could theoretically both generate a preference for and an aversion toward
information as a policy tool. On the one hand, in line with what Aghion et al. (2010) and
others have argued, if people have little trust in their fellow citizens or business actors, and
they have little trust that they will do what is right for the environment, then information
is not considered coercive enough. If environmental protection in such societies has
evolved into a collective action dilemma, soft policy tools such as information would not
be an efficient choice. People want regulation and punishment not because they trust or
believe that the state can solve the problem of environmental degradation, but because they
have very little trust that other actors will cooperate and act in an environmentally friendly
manner. On the other hand, information does not imply as much bureaucratic discretion
and it does not increase the risk of more corruption as do, for example, new tax policies
or regulations (Damania, 2002). To sum up, the effects of QoG on having information as
a policy preference can go either way.
Pro-environmental policy instruments can target average citizens and business actors, and
this study is interested in both. Presumably, there could be differences in policy preferences
among citizens because people are less likely to support a coercive instrument that in the
end would have an effect on themselves. On the other hand, there are not necessarily any
major differences in policy preferences between instruments targeting people in general
and instruments targeting business actors. If trust in general is low, people want to punish
free-riding behaviour among business actors and among their fellow citizens by harsher
regulation. For example, experimental designs have shown that people who participate in
public goods experiments have a tendency to punish those who cheat or defect, even if it
is costly to do so (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). If trust is high, however, people trust business
actors, citizens and political institutions and are therefore more positive toward economic
incentives, regardless of whether these instruments reward business actors or citizens in
general.
Method and Material
As mentioned in the introduction, some studies find that low levels of QoG have a
negative effect on preference for economic pro-environmental policy instruments, while
other studies find that low levels of QoG generate a demand for regulation in general (e.g.
Aghion et al., 2010; Harring, 2014). This article does not study one particular policy tool,
but rather the choice between different policy instruments. Using a dataset from the
International Social Survey Programme: Environment III – ISSP 2010, there is also an
opportunity to study cross-country variation further by dissecting individual-level rela-
tionships: specifically, whether social and/or political trust generate preferences for taxes
and whether low social trust generates a preference for harsher regulation.
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The data cover 30 countries and 45,199 respondents. The mode of data collection, as
well as the respondent rate, differs across countries. Face-to-face interviews were used in
some countries, and postal self-completion questionnaires in others.2 The data were
collected during 2010 and 2011. An advantage of this dataset is that it is possible to make
a distinction between (a) preferences for policy instruments aiming to steer business actors
and (b) preferences for policy instruments aiming to steer average citizens. Therefore, there
will be two separate analyses with different outcome variables. The first analysis concerns
the steering of citizens, and the following question is used: ‘Which of these approaches do
you think would be the best way of getting people and their families in [COUNTRY] to
protect the environment?’ Respondents are given the following options: (1) ‘Heavy fines
for people who damage the environment’; (2) ‘Use the tax system to reward people who
protect the environment’; and (3) ‘More information and education for people about the
advantages of protecting the environment.’ The other analysis concerns business and uses
a very similar question, except that ‘people and their families’ is replaced by ‘business and
industry’.3 The response variables are categorical. The respondents can choose from
different kinds of policy tools that are not ranked or ordered in any way, and therefore a
multinomial logistic estimation technique is used to study the probability of having a
certain policy preference. Table 1 shows the percentage of the total population choosing
each alternative.
It is quite clear that people are much more likely to prefer punishment via fines when
targeting the behaviour of business actors (40 per cent) compared to people in general (26
per cent). For information, it is the complete opposite; people are much more positive
toward information when it targets people in general (45 per cent) compared to business
actors (27 per cent). In the case of using the tax system to reward actors, the figures are
similar for business actors (33 per cent) and people in general (29 per cent). The expla-
nation may of course be that people perceive business actors to be conceptually different
Table 1: Preferences toward Different Pro-Environmental Policy Instruments
Which of these approaches do you think would be the best way of getting people
and their families in [COUNTRY] to protect the environment?
Heavy fines for people who damage the environment 26%
Use the tax system to reward people who protect the environment 29%
More information and education for people about the advantages of protecting
the environment
45%
Which of these approaches do you think would be the best way of getting
business and industry in [COUNTRY] to protect the environment?
Heavy fines for businesses that damage the environment 40%
Use the tax system to reward businesses that protect the environment 33%
More information and education for businesses about the advantages for
protecting the environment
27%
Notes: Percentage in each category. The alternative ‘Can’t choose’ and missing cases are excluded.
Source: Data International Social Survey Programme (2010).
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from people in general and therefore different kinds of policies are needed. Nevertheless,
to some extent this confirms the assumption that people are less likely to prefer policies
designed to punish if such policies might affect them directly.
One may argue that there is no actual difference between paying a fine and paying taxes;
that in the end, anyone who behaves or consumes in a way that has negative environmental
consequences must pay. However, previous studies show that in a cross-national perspec-
tive, populations that view taxes as effective policy instruments also view other economic
incentives (such as subsidies) as effective, while they are less likely to view regulatory
measures (such as heavier fines and stricter regulation) as effective instruments (Harring,
2014). Theoretically, there is also a difference between punishing defectors by making
them pay heavier fines and rewarding environmentally friendly behaviour by modifying
taxes. As the questions are framed, it is also very clear that fines are for punishing people
who do not cooperate, while taxes are for rewarding people who cooperate.
As this research departs from cross-country studies and aims to study whether the level
of QoG affects policy preference, its main focus is on cross-national variance. However,
individual-level variables are also tested in order to grasp whether individual-level mecha-
nisms can be confirmed, if social trust and/or political trust matter. Accordingly, the study
combines analysis on both contextual (country) and individual (citizen) levels. The assump-
tion that people’s attitudes are to some extent formed by country context violates a central
assumption in regression analysis. Observations would then not be independent and there
would be a risk of biased standard errors and estimates if the hierarchical structure of the
data were not considered. To deal with this risk, a multilevel technique is applied, with a
two-level random intercept model, where citizens are assumed to be nested within
countries.
Independent Variables
To measure QoG, data are used from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
produced by the PRS Group. The objective of the PRS Group is to provide information
about investment risk in foreign countries, based on expert analysis using both quantitative
and qualitative data. The measure contains three parts: political risk, financial risk and
economic risk. Political risk contains information, for example, about ‘ethnic tensions’ and
‘external conflict’. A slimmer version of this measure is used based on three components in
order to find a measure of QoG: the components are ‘Corruption,’ ‘Law and order’ and
‘Bureaucracy’.4 The ICRG index is often used as a measure in cross-country comparisons,
and is also highly correlated with other similar measures, such as the Corruption Perceptions
Index from Transparency International (Svensson, 2005). Low scores indicate that political
institutions are corrupt and inefficient, and high scores indicate that the institutions are based
on principles such as the rule of law, impartiality, and meritocracy. The measure is rescaled
to fit the sample and ranges from 0 (Bulgaria and Russia) to 1 (Finland) (see Table 2).
In order to test the hypotheses and make comparisons in a cross-national perspective, a
set of other variables has to be considered. Economic inequality is one important aspect.
Even though it is disputed whether economic pro-environmental instruments, such as
taxes, have regressive effects (Dresner and Ekins, 2004; Sterner, 2012), the argument that
such instruments disproportionately affect poor people is widespread (Sterner, 2012).
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Furthermore, perceptions of unfairness are argued to trigger free-riding tendencies (Eek
and Biel, 2003; Wilke, 1991) and thus more tax evasion which, plausibly, affects attitudes
toward such policy tools. Moreover, studies find that economic inequality has a negative
effect on preferences for economic instruments (e.g. Harring, 2014). Economic inequality
is based on a measure of income Gini coefficient obtained from the World Income
Inequality Database of the World Institute for Development Economics Research.5 The
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
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income Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1. The end points are hypothetical, where 0
indicates no income differences at all, and 1 indicates that one person in that country
receives all its income. In the analysis, the scale is recalibrated so the country with the
highest level of economic inequality has a rating of 1 (South Africa) and the country with
the lowest score has a rating of 0 (Slovenia).
Pro-environmental policy instruments might be perceived to imply higher costs or even
to dampen economic growth, which might be less attractive in societies that have not
reached a certain level of economic development, which in the end might affect policy
preferences. Furthermore, in the literature on cross-country differences in attitudes toward
the environment in general, the main discussion revolves around the effects of economic
development (Dunlap and York, 2008; Franzen and Meyer, 2010; Franzen and Vogl,
2013). In order to measure economic development, gross domestic product (purchasing
power parity) per capita from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic
Outlook Database is used.6 Several of the countries in the study with ineffective public
institutions are post-communist states that have a certain legacy of control and state
intervention, which may affect policy preferences. Therefore, a dummy for communist
legacy is also included in the analysis.
Regarding the individual-level variables, both political trust and social trust are hard to
capture and measure. Even though the origins of social trust are disputed, social trust is
clearly correlated with well-functioning political institutions. To measure social trust, an
index is built out of two questions (Cronbach’s α = 0.70): ‘Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’
with responses rated on a scale from 1 (‘can’t be too careful’) to 5 (‘most people can be
trusted’); and ‘Generally speaking, do you think that most people would try to take
advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?’ with responses rated
on a scale from 1 (‘most people would try to take advantage of you’) to 5 (‘most people
would try to be fair’).7 The correlation between QoG and social trust (collapsed to country
level) is strong (0.78).
Political trust has also been defined in different ways and argued to have various origins.
In this article, it is perceived to be based on the assessment of political institutions, and
hence generated in response to the actual performance of these institutions. Two state-
ments in ISSP 2010 measure political trust: ‘Most of the time we can trust people in
government to do what is right’ (trust in government); and ‘Most politicians are in politics
only for what they can get out of it personally’ (trust in politicians). Studying the
correlation between the two measures of political trust (aggregated to country) and QoG,
trust in politicians (0.81) is much more highly correlated with QoG than trust in govern-
ment (0.17). Why the latter correlation is so weak is not perfectly clear. Even though ISSP
tries to capture the regime with ‘trust in government’ and not a particular government, it
is plausible that the perceptions are based on whether one supports the incumbents or not,
while trust in politicians is more based on an overall assessment of political representatives.
Hence, ‘trust in politicians’ is used as an indicator of political trust.
It is important to include personal income in an analysis of preference of pro-
environmental policy instruments since income is found to affect the support or preference
for economic incentives (Hammar and Jagers, 2006; Harring, 2014; Harring and Jagers,
REWARD OR PUNISH? 9
© 2015 The Author. Political Studies © 2015 Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2015
2013). The assumption is that people with higher incomes are less averse to economic
incentives because they feel that they can afford the increased costs. In the survey, the
respondents are asked to state their income in national currencies. Personal income is
divided into deciles, generating a comparative measure of relative income in each country.
The effect is expected to diminish at higher levels of income and therefore a logarithmic
measure is used.
Another important control variable is ideology or party affiliation. Attitudes toward
government steering are typically affected by ideology. Some studies find that both people
ideologically to the left and those ideologically to the right are more positive toward
economic incentives compared to people without a distinct left or right position. It is
possible that people to the left have a more positive attitude toward taxation and subsidies
in general, while people to the right (at least if right is seen as market-oriented) are more
positive toward market-based mechanisms involved in economic incentives (Harring,
2014). Ideological position is determined based on a question about party affiliation (far
left, centre-left, centre-liberal, right-conservative, far right, other and no party affiliation).8
Presumably, people are more supportive of coercive policies if they perceive themselves
to be affected by environmental degradation. From the statement ‘Environmental problems
have a direct effect on my everyday life’, three different categories are created: people who
agree, people who disagree, and people who neither agree nor disagree with the statement.
Furthermore, age and gender are included in the analyses. These two demographic
variables are argued to matter for people’s attitudes toward the environment and environ-
mental protection policies, where young people and women are more positive toward
environmental protection in general (Hornback, 1974; Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980).9 In
the analysis of preferences toward different policy instruments targeting ‘business and
industry’, a control for whether the respondent is an employer, employee or self-employed
is also included. Employers, as business owners, may potentially have different preferences
from employees as they are more directly affected.
Results
In Figure 1 we see a substantial variation in policy preference across countries. The ‘use
[of ] the tax system to reward people who protect the environment’ is the most favoured
tool in Austria, Belgium and Canada, and least favoured in South Africa, Argentina and
Spain. More than 50 per cent of Austrians think that tax is the best policy tool, while only
15 per cent of South Africans think so – a result that supports the hypothesis. Austria scores
high on the QoG index while South Africa scores very low. Furthermore, in other
countries that score rather low on the QoG index, like Bulgaria, Croatia and Russia, about
50 per cent of the populations prefer heavier fines, while in countries with high levels of
QoG, such as Sweden, Finland and Norway, these tools are not favoured.
Testing the hypotheses more formally required a multilevel regression analysis.10 Table 3
shows preferences for various pro-environmental policy instruments to steer ordinary
citizens to act in a more environmentally friendly manner. The results show support for
H1: when QoG is low, people have a preference for regulation, and as the level of QoG
increases, the aversion toward taxes decreases and the preference for regulation decreases.
Model 1 shows odds ratios.11 As an odds ratio below 1 indicates a lower probability, we see
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that, on a contextual level, QoG has a significant positive effect on preference for taxation
as a policy option: as QoG in a country increases, people are more likely to choose taxes
as a policy option (2.45) and less likely to choose fines (0.40).
Figure 2 illustrates the predicted probability of choosing a certain policy tool at different
levels of QoG. As is clear, information is always the most favoured option regardless of
QoG. There is a small effect in the analysis that indicates that information as a policy tool
is less preferred in countries with high QoG scores. However, it does not change much as
the level of QoG changes. Why the preferences for information are high regardless of level
of QoG is hard to say. There could, as suggested above, be competing effects. On the one
hand, information demands less bureaucratic capacity and might for that reason be the most
favoured policy tool in countries with ineffective and corrupt public institutions. On the
other hand, information is not coercive enough if people have low levels of trust in their
fellow citizens, while it could be a more attractive choice in countries with high trust.














































































































































Source: International Social Survey Programme: Environment III – ISSP 2010. ‘Which of these approaches do you think would be
the best way of getting people and their families in [COUNTRY] to protect the environment?’ with the options (1) Heavy fines for
people who damage the environment, (2) Use the tax system to reward people who protect the environment, and (3) More
information and education for people about the advantages of protecting the environment.
Note: Those choosing no response are left out of the analysis.
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Table 3: Impact of QoG and Trust on Pro-Environmental Policy Instrument Preferences
Targeting Average Citizens, Multinomial Logistic Regression
Model 1 Model 2





1.17*** 0.16*** 0.84*** −0.17*** 0.90** −0.10**
[1.09,1.26] (0.04) [0.77,0.91] (0.04) [0.85,0.96] (0.03)
Political
trust
1.06* 0.06* 0.94* −0.06* 0.93** −0.07**
[1.01,1.12] (0.03) [0.89,0.98] (0.03) [0.88,0.98] (0.03)
Income(log) 1.12* 0.11* 0.89** −0.12** 1.05* 0.05* 1.10* 0.09* 0.90** −0.10** 1.06* 0.06*
[1.03,1.22] (0.04) [0.82,0.96] (0.04) [1.00,1.10] (0.02) [1.01,1.19] (0.04) [0.84,0.97] (0.04) [1.00,1.11] (0.03)
Agea
15–30 1.40*** 0.34*** 0.70*** −0.35*** 1.10 0.10 1.39*** 0.33*** 0.72*** −0.33*** 1.11 0.11
[1.21,1.62] (0.07) [0.61,0.81] (0.07) [0.96,1.27] (0.07) [1.20,1.61] (0.07) [0.62,0.83] (0.07) [0.97,1.28] (0.07)
31–45 1.45*** 0.37*** 0.68*** −0.39*** 1.11 0.10 1.45*** 0.37*** 0.68*** −0.39*** 1.11 0.10
[1.26,1.68] (0.07) [0.59,0.78] (0.07) [0.98,1.25] (0.06) [1.26,1.68] (0.07) [0.59,0.78] (0.07) [0.98,1.25] (0.06)
Gender(female) 0.99 −0.01 1.02 0.02 1.05 0.05 0.99 −0.01 1.01 0.01 1.05 0.05
[0.90,1.09] (0.05) [0.93,1.11] (0.04) [0.96,1.16] (0.05) [0.90,1.09] (0.05) [0.93,1.10] (0.04) [0.96,1.15] (0.05)
Political affiliationb
Far left 1.04 0.04 1.01 0.01 1.01 0.01 1.08 0.08 1.02 0.02 1.03 0.03
[0.77,1.40] (0.15) [0.74,1.38] (0.16) [0.73,1.38] (0.16) [0.84,1.39] (0.13) [0.76,1.36] (0.15) [0.78,1.35] (0.14)
Centre left 1.00 0.00 1.12 0.11 1.12 0.11 0.99 −0.01 1.15 0.14 1.14 0.13
[0.87,1.16] (0.07) [0.97,1.28] (0.07) [0.95,1.33] (0.09) [0.86,1.15] (0.07) [1.00,1.34] (0.07) [1.00,1.30] (0.07)
Centre liberal 1.24 0.21 0.78** −0.25** 0.89 −0.11 1.27* 0.24* 0.80** −0.23** 0.86 −0.15
[0.97,1.57] (0.12) [0.65,0.93] (0.09) [0.72,1.12] (0.11) [1.01,1.58] (0.11) [0.67,0.95] (0.09) [0.70,1.06] (0.10)
Conservative 1.14 0.13 0.98 −0.02 1.02 0.02 1.13 0.12 1.00 0.00 1.06 0.05
[0.98,1.33] (0.08) [0.85,1.12] (0.07) [0.79,1.32] (0.13) [0.96,1.33] (0.08) [0.86,1.16] (0.08) [0.84,1.33] (0.12)
Far right 0.95 −0.05 1.33* 0.28* 1.18 0.17 1.06 0.05 1.34** 0.29** 1.20 0.18
[0.64,1.42] (0.20) [1.06,1.68] (0.12) [0.81,1.73] (0.19) [0.72,1.55] (0.20) [1.08,1.66] (0.11) [0.80,1.79] (0.21)
Affected by environmental degradationc
Agree 0.85** −0.16** 1.14** 0.13** 1.06 0.06 0.86** −0.16** 1.13* 0.12* 1.05 0.05
[0.76,0.95] (0.06) [1.04,1.26] (0.05) [0.93,1.21] (0.07) [0.77,0.96] (0.06) [1.03,1.24] (0.05) [0.92,1.21] (0.07)
Disagree 0.99 −0.01 1.00 0.00 0.93 −0.08 1.00 −0.00 1.02 0.02 0.93 −0.07




5.65*** 1.73*** 0.14*** −1.94*** 0.40* −0.92* 2.45** 0.90** 0.40** −0.91** 0.82 −0.20
[2.92,10.93] (0.34) [0.06,0.32] (0.41) [0.17,0.93] (0.43) [1.32,4.53] (0.31) [0.22,0.72] (0.30) [0.45,1.47] (0.30)
Economic
equality
0.65 −0.42 1.66 0.51 0.91 −0.10 0.36** −1.02** 2.37*** 0.86*** 1.81* 0.60*
[0.34,1.25] (0.33) [0.80,3.45] (0.37) [0.40,2.07] (0.42) [0.20,0.67] (0.31) [1.46,3.85] (0.25) [1.05,3.12] (0.28)
GDP per
capita (log)
0.93 −0.08 0.95 −0.05 1.16 0.15 0.85* −0.16* 0.97 −0.03 1.07 0.07
[0.80,1.07] (0.07) [0.78,1.15] (0.10) [0.93,1.45] (0.11) [0.74,0.98] (0.07) [0.81,1.17] (0.09) [0.89,1.28] (0.09)
Post-communist
country
0.75 −0.29 1.38 0.32 2.66*** 0.98*** 0.59* −0.53* 2.01*** 0.70*** 3.90*** 1.36***
[0.46,1.20] (0.24) [1.00,1.92] (0.17) [1.80,3.93] (0.20) [0.38,0.93] (0.23) [1.51,2.69] (0.15) [2.75,5.54] (0.18)
Random effects
Constant 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.26*** 0.37*** 0.34*** 0.42***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Log
likelihood
−22,302.76 −22,137.02 −22,200.66 −22,258.66 −22,080.37 −22,135.72
AIC 44,659.52 44,330.03 44,455.32 44,573.32 44,214.73 44,327.45
N (Level 1) 21,978 21,978 21,978 21,978 21,978 21,978
N (Level 2) 28 28 28 28 28 28
Notes: The entries to the left are odds ratios and the entries to the right are logistic coefficients. For the odds ratios, the parentheses show confidence intervals.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. For the coefficients, the parentheses show robust standard errors. An odds ratio greater than 1.00 indicates an increased probability,
and an odds ratio below 1.00 indicates a decreased probability of choosing a certain pro-environmental policy instrument as an independent variable increases by
one unit. aThe reference category is people aged ‘46+’. bThe reference category is people with ‘no party affiliation’ and ‘other’. cThe reference category is can neither
agree nor disagree with the statement that ‘Environmental problems have a direct effect on my everyday life’.
Source: International Social Survey Programme: Environment III – ISSP 2010.
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For taxation and regulation however, QoG is important, and there are quite substantial
differences. The probability of choosing fines decreases substantially as QoG increases, and
the reverse is true for taxation, even under control for other country-level variables, such
as economic development, economic inequality and communist legacy.12 Examining the
other country variables as such, we see that people living in economically unequal societies
tend to be more likely to choose fines as a policy tool, which is also the case for people in
post-communist countries. The effect of economic development is less stable, with
non-significant effects on preferences for fines.
Examining the individual-level hypotheses, political trust makes people more likely to
choose taxes and less likely to choose fines. To some extent this confirms a direct effect of
QoG on policy preference; bureaucratic capacity is important for attitude formation. If
people do not have political trust, they are less likely to prefer taxation.13 Studying the other
main individual-level variable – social trust – which could be conceptualised more as an
indirect causal link between QoG and policy preferences, the results confirm H2: low
social trust generates a preference for regulation and an aversion toward taxation, and as
social trust increases, the aversion toward taxation decreases and the preference for regu-
lation decreases. People choose coercive punitive policies because they distrust their fellow
citizens, and they are more positive toward economic instruments as social trust increases.
Figure 2: Probabilities for Support for Different Pro-Environmental Policy Instruments (EPI)
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Source: International Social Survey Programme 2010. Unweighted estimates. 95% confidence intervals.
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Comparing models 1 and 2, there are indications that the trust variables to some extent also
moderate the effect of QoG on policy choice since when they are introduced the effect of
QoG is less strong.14
Furthermore, an increase in income generates a higher probability of choosing taxes.
Regarding ideology, it is hard to draw any general conclusion. People who state that they
sympathise with a party defined as liberal or at the centre are more positive toward taxes and
less positive toward fines, while people to the political left are more likely to choose fines.
However, few of the estimated parameters are significant. Those affected by environmental
degradation seem to be more willing to punish those who pollute, and less positive toward
taxes. Yet again, few of the estimated parameters are statistically significant. Gender does not
seem to have any effect at all, while the other demographic variable – age – does to some
extent. Young people are more likely to choose taxes and less likely to choose fines.
As argued above, it is important to study whether there are any differences in preferences
regarding instruments that target citizens or instruments that target business actors. For the
main variables no important differences were found. Low QoG generates a preference for
regulation and an aversion toward taxation, including for instruments targeting business
actors. Social and political trust, as individual-level indicators, make people more likely to
choose taxes and less likely to prefer fines. When the policy instrument targets business
actors, economic inequality has a more stable effect. People in economically equal societies
are less averse to taxes, while people in unequal societies want stricter regulation. Presum-
ably, the level of conflict in unequal societies is higher, which also generates distrust
between business actors and regular citizens and generates a preference for punishment
tools (see Table 4).
There are no major differences between policies that target individual citizens and
policies that target business actors for the other individual-level variables; for gender, age
and political affiliation, few of the estimates are significant. In the models investigating
policy preferences when the instruments target business actors, yet another control variable
is included in terms of whether the respondent is self-employed, an employer or an
employee. There are significant effects: employers tend to choose taxes whereas employees
are more likely to choose fines.
The finding that there are no major differences in how levels of QoG and trust affect
policy preferences whether the policy targets citizens in general or business actors confirms
the assumption that people are more likely to prefer reward-based policies in some contexts
and more likely to prefer punitive policies in others. People do not trust a corrupt and
ineffective government to manage a tax system, neither do they trust actors to comply with
it; they therefore prefer regulation and punishment. The findings are interesting in light of
previous results showing that coercive regulations in corrupt contexts also have a negative
effect on the creation of trust and civic attitudes (Aghion et al., 2010). Countries or
societies may be stuck in a negative trend, where distrust generates a preference for
coercive regulatory policies, and coercive policies generate uncivic behaviour and values,
as well as lower levels of social trust. That dynamic, however, could not be confirmed in
this analysis. The best way to study such trends would be by using time-series data. In the
final section, the contributions of this study and future research suggestions are further
discussed.
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Table 4: Impact of QoG and Trust on Pro-Environmental Policy Instrument Preferences
Targeting Business Actors, Multinomial Logistic Regression
Model 1 Model 2





1.16*** 0.15*** 0.84*** −0.17*** 0.93** −0.07**
[1.11,1.22] (0.03) [0.80,0.89] (0.03) [0.89,0.97] (0.02)
Political
trust
1.13*** 0.13*** 0.88*** −0.13*** 0.92*** −0.08***
[1.09,1.18] (0.02) [0.84,0.91] (0.02) [0.88,0.96] (0.02)
Income(log) 1.20*** 0.18*** 0.82*** −0.19*** 1.07** 0.06** 1.15*** 0.14*** 0.85*** −0.16*** 1.08** 0.08**
[1.11,1.30] (0.04) [0.76,0.89] (0.04) [1.02,1.12] (0.02) [1.06,1.25] (0.04) [0.79,0.91] (0.04) [1.03,1.14] (0.03)
Agea
15–30 1.17*** 0.15*** 0.84*** −0.18*** 1.07 0.07 1.16** 0.15** 0.84** −0.17** 1.07 0.07
[1.07,1.28] (0.05) [0.76,0.92] (0.05) [0.93,1.23] (0.07) [1.05,1.28] (0.05) [0.76,0.93] (0.05) [0.93,1.23] (0.07)
31–45 1.25*** 0.22*** 0.78*** −0.25*** 1.10 0.09 1.25*** 0.22*** 0.77*** −0.26*** 1.10 0.09
[1.13,1.37] (0.05) [0.70,0.86] (0.05) [0.97,1.24] (0.06) [1.13,1.38] (0.05) [0.70,0.86] (0.05) [0.97,1.23] (0.06)
Gender(female) 1.06 0.06 0.94 −0.06 1.08 0.08 1.08 0.08 0.92 −0.08 1.07 0.07
[0.96,1.18] (0.05) [0.86,1.04] (0.05) [0.98,1.19] (0.05) [0.98,1.20] (0.05) [0.84,1.02] (0.05) [0.98,1.17] (0.05)
Occupationb
Employed 0.81** −0.22** 1.23* 0.21* 1.13 0.13 0.80** −0.22** 1.25* 0.22* 1.14* 0.13*
[0.69,0.94] (0.08) [1.02,1.47] (0.09) [1.00,1.29] (0.07) [0.70,0.93] (0.07) [1.05,1.49] (0.09) [1.00,1.30] (0.07)
Employer 1.19 0.18 0.79 −0.23 0.73** −0.31** 1.21 0.19 0.80 −0.22 0.73** −0.31**
[0.97,1.47] (0.11) [0.62,1.01] (0.12) [0.60,0.90] (0.10) [0.99,1.49] (0.10) [0.64,1.01] (0.12) [0.60,0.90] (0.11)
Political affiliationc
Far left 0.84 −0.17 1.23 0.21 1.41* 0.34* 0.77** −0.26** 1.34** 0.29** 1.47** 0.38**
[0.71,1.01] (0.09) [0.98,1.54] (0.11) [1.09,1.83] (0.13) [0.65,0.92] (0.09) [1.10,1.62] (0.10) [1.12,1.93] (0.14)
Centre
left
1.08 0.08 1.04 0.04 1.17*** 0.16*** 0.97 −0.03 1.11 0.11 1.22*** 0.20***
[0.94,1.26] (0.08) [0.87,1.24] (0.09) [1.07,1.29] (0.05) [0.82,1.15] (0.09) [0.94,1.31] (0.09) [1.11,1.34] (0.05)
Centre
liberal
1.26* 0.23* 0.80** −0.23** 1.05 0.05 1.13 0.12 0.88 −0.12 1.10 0.10
[1.05,1.52] (0.09) [0.68,0.94] (0.08) [0.91,1.21] (0.07) [0.93,1.36] (0.10) [0.75,1.05] (0.09) [0.97,1.26] (0.07)
Conservative 1.20** 0.18** 0.90 −0.10 1.08 0.08 1.08 0.08 0.96 −0.04 1.11 0.11
[1.06,1.36] (0.06) [0.79,1.03] (0.07) [0.95,1.22] (0.06) [0.95,1.24] (0.07) [0.83,1.11] (0.07) [0.98,1.26] (0.06)
Far right 0.78 −0.24 1.49*** 0.40*** 1.16 0.15 0.77 −0.26 1.45** 0.37** 1.14 0.13
[0.57,1.07] (0.16) [1.20,1.83] (0.11) [0.79,1.70] (0.19) [0.56,1.06] (0.16) [1.15,1.84] (0.12) [0.75,1.72] (0.21)
Affected by environmental degradationd
Agree 0.90* −0.11* 1.08 0.07 1.10 0.09 0.91 −0.09 1.09* 0.08* 1.09 0.08
[0.82,0.98] (0.05) [0.99,1.16] (0.04) [0.97,1.24] (0.06) [0.83,1.00] (0.05) [1.00,1.18] (0.04) [0.96,1.24] (0.06)
Disagree 1.01 0.01 0.99 −0.01 0.93 −0.07 1.02 0.02 1.00 −0.00 0.93 −0.08




2.43*** 0.89*** 0.34*** −1.07*** 1.26 0.23 1.29 0.26 0.40*** −0.93*** 1.45* 0.37*
[1.66,3.57] (0.20) [0.22,0.54] (0.24) [0.89,1.78] (0.18) [0.89,1.87] (0.19) [0.28,0.57] (0.18) [1.03,2.03] (0.17)
Economic
equality
0.21*** −1.56*** 2.21*** 0.79*** 1.29 0.26 0.33*** −1.12*** 1.81*** 0.59*** 1.29 0.25
[0.13,0.33] (0.23) [1.42,3.45] (0.23) [0.89,1.87] (0.19) [0.21,0.51] (0.22) [1.31,2.50] (0.16) [0.94,1.75] (0.16)
GDP per
capita (log)
0.94 −0.06 1.14* 0.13* 1.27*** 0.24*** 0.91* −0.10* 1.02 0.02 1.27*** 0.24***
[0.86,1.02] (0.04) [1.01,1.30] (0.07) [1.16,1.40] (0.05) [0.84,0.98] (0.04) [0.90,1.16] (0.07) [1.18,1.37] (0.04)
Post-communist
country
0.63** −0.47** 1.28* 0.25* 3.13*** 1.14*** 0.79 −0.24 0.91 −0.09 3.11*** 1.13***
[0.45,0.86] (0.16) [1.01,1.63] (0.12) [2.37,4.15] (0.14) [0.57,1.10] (0.17) [0.75,1.11] (0.10) [2.42,3.98] (0.13)
Random effects
Constant 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.30*** 0.42*** 0.36*** 0.30***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
Log likelihood −19,429.02 −19,454.14 −19,448.77 −19,350.24 −19,360.42 −19,332.95
AIC 38,912.03 38,964.29 38,953.54 38,754.48 38,774.84 38,719.90
N 18,892 18,892 18,892 18,892 18,892 18,892
N (Level 2) 28 28 28 28 28 28
Notes: The entries to the left are odds ratios and the entries to the right are logistic coefficients. For the odds ratios, the parentheses show confidence intervals.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. For the coefficients, the parentheses show robust standard errors. An odds ratio greater than 1.00 indicates an increased probability,
and an odds ratio below 1.00 indicates a decreased probability of choosing a certain pro-environmental policy instrument as an independent variable increases by
one unit. aThe reference category is people aged ‘46+’. bThe reference category is ‘self-employed’. cThe reference category is people with ‘no party affiliation’ and
‘other’. dThe reference category is can neither agree nor disagree with the statement that ‘Environmental problems have a direct effect on my everyday life’.
Source: International Social Survey Programme: Environment III – ISSP 2010.
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Concluding Remarks
This study makes four major contributions to the research. First, it discusses the trade-off
between government failure and market failure and finds that it generates preferences for
different kinds of policy instruments. As stated at the beginning of the article, people living
in societies with low QoG may want more steering in general in terms of both regulation
and economic incentives since they have low levels of social trust. However, when they
have to make a choice, people in countries with corrupt and ineffective institutions are
more likely to choose stronger regulatory instruments, while people living in societies with
high QoG are more likely to choose economic incentives. Accordingly, the conclusions
drawn from previous research that low QoG generates a demand for regulation are both
confirmed and somewhat revised in this report. There is a preference for regulation in
societies with low QoG, explained by low trust in other citizens and a willingness to
punish, while people must have a high level of social trust in order to support instruments
that reward. In this context, it is important to emphasise the individual-level effect of
political trust indicating that bureaucratic discretion is also important for people’s policy
choices. People with little trust in political institutions do not prefer taxation that entails a
redistribution of resources and increases the risk of corruption.
Second, the analysis includes attitudes toward the steering of business actors and the
steering of citizens. The results indicate that people are more likely to choose punitive
instruments when targeting the behaviour of business actors, but there are no major
differences regarding the effects of QoG and trust on preferences for type of steering. The
mechanisms are similar. People prefer to punish actors independently of whether they are
citizens or business actors, and they choose economic incentive rewards, both for business
actors and citizens, in societies where trust in general is high. So, independent of whether
citizens are affected by the policy, they want to punish defectors.
Third, in this study, environmental policy is chosen to illustrate the distinction between
regulatory and economic incentives, and by doing so, it contributes to the literature on
attitudes toward environmental policy in general, which has mostly used national data or
experimental designs (e.g. Cherry et al., 2012; De Groot and Schuitema, 2012; Hammar
and Jagers, 2006; Lubell et al., 2007; Steg et al., 2005). In a comparative perspective, there
are numerous studies on country differences in citizens’ degree of environmental concern,
environmental behaviour and willingness to make economic sacrifices for environmental
protection (Abramson, 1997; Brechin and Kempton, 1994; 1997; Diekmann and Franzen,
1999; Duit, 2011; Dunlap and Mertig, 1997; Dunlap and York, 2008; Franzen, 2003;
Franzen and Meyer, 2010; Franzen and Vogl, 2013; Harring, 2013; Kemmelmeier et al.,
2002). Nevertheless, there are few cross-country studies on individuals’ preference for
different kinds of pro-environmental policy instruments (Harring, 2014).
Finally, there are several experimental studies advancing intricate explanations as to why
people cooperate or choose to reward and punish each other, where trust and perceptions
of free-riding are important factors (e.g. Berg et al., 1995; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Hilbe
and Sigmund, 2010; Ostrom, 2000). This study has shown how these concepts can be
applied to a problem on a much larger scale; the conclusion is that people with little trust
are also more likely to prefer punishment tools in such settings. As Aghion et al. (2010)
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show, distrust generates a demand for regulation, while regulation generates even more
distrust. Future research can, based on the results in this article, further develop this
argument and study whether certain policies can also build trust. Hence, the dynamics
between trust and state intervention can be further explored.
(Accepted: 28 January 2015)
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Notes
1 It is important to note that Scholz and Lubell discuss tax compliance in general – and not compliance with environmental taxes.
2 See the Appendix.
3 ‘Which of these approaches do you think would be the best way of getting business and industry in [country] to protect the
environment?’
4 Obtained from the Quality of Government Institute (Teorell et al., 2011). http://www.qog.pol.gu.se
5 Obtained from the Quality of Government Institute (Teorell et al., 2011). http://www.qog.pol.gu.se
6 The World Economic Outlook Database: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/weodata/index.aspx
7 In connection to this, it is important to mention that, unfortunately, the survey does not include a question on trust in business
actors.
8 Two countries in the study – Taiwan and Israel – do not have this item in the survey; hence they are excluded from the analysis.
9 Furthermore, there are other demographic or socio-economic variables that could have been included in the models such as
marital status and whether one has children. However, in some countries these questions are not included in the survey. Yet
models with these variables have been tested and there are small or insignificant effects.
10 Estimated by using the gllamm command (with the mlogit link) in Stata (Grilli and Rampichini, 2006; Rabe-Hesketh et al.,
2004).
11 The ISSP provides design weights to calculate for survey sampling biases, and the analyses have been performed using scaled
design weights (Carle, 2009), except in Figure 2, which is based on unweighted estimates.
12 These are correlated. However, the variance inflation factor (VIF) indicates an acceptable level of correlation and there are no
severe problems of multicollinearity. The mean VIF is 1.51 and for QoG it is 3.58.
13 It can also be noted that there was another indicator of political trust: ‘trust in government’, which has been tested and showed
no significant effects. To some extent this was expected, as ‘trust in government’ is less correlated with QoG.
14 The correlation between social trust and political trust is 0.32. Several specifications have been tested for robustness checks – e.g.
with QoG as the only cross-national variable and models excluding social trust but not political trust and vice versa. The different
analyses show similar results. The effects are significant.
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